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ABSTRACT
The israeli high tech sector is widely regarded as a hotbed of cutting-edge technologies, and
as the growth engine of the israeli economy in the nineties and beyond. In this paper we present a
close-up portrait of innovation in Israel for the past 30 years, with the aid of highly detailed patent
data. We use for that purpose all israeli patents taken in the US (over 7,000), as well as US patents
and patents from other countries for comparative purposes. The time path of israeli patenting reveals
big jumps in the mid eighties and then again in the early nineties, reflecting underlying "shocks" in
policy and in the availability of relevant inputs. Israeli ranks high in terms of patents per capita,
compared to the G7, the "Asian Tigers" and a group of countries with similar GDP per capita.
Finland is strikingly similar, Taiwan's patenting has grown extremely fast and is now onpar with
Israel, South Korea is rapidly closing the gap. The technological composition of israeli innovations
reflects quite well world-wide technological trends, except that Computers and Communications,
the fastest growing field in the US, has grown even faster in Israel. The weak side resides in the
composition of israeli assignees, the actual owners of the intellectual property rights: just 35% of
israeli patents were assigned to israeli corporations, a much lower percentage than in most other
countries. Relatively large shares went to foreign assignees, to Universities and the Government. and
to private inventors. On the other hand israeli patents are of good "quality" in terms of citations
received (and getting better over time): US patents command on average more citations, but not in
Computers and Communications or in Biotechnology, and Israeli patents are significantly better than
those of the reference group of countries.
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I. Introduction
In the aftermath of the six-day war, Israel embarked in an ambitious course aimed
at developing "high-tech" industries, as a means to exploit its perceived comparative
advantage in world-class academic resources and highly skilled labor (contrasted to its
relatively poor endowment in natural resources). The government undertook to actively
support industrial R&D aimed primarily at export markets, in addition to harnessing the
spillovers from a sophisticated defense R&D sector. And indeed, the last two decades
have seen a surge of activity in high tech fields in Israel, ranging from computer
software to communications equipment to advanced medical devices to biotechnology.
As a consequence, Israel is widely regarded as one of the few Silicon Valley type of
technology centers outside the US, and has turned into an attractive location for R&D
operations of leading multinationals.
We intend in this paper to provide a close-up portrait of the israeli high tech sector
with the aid of highly detailed patent data, drawn from all patents granted in the US to
israeli inventors, and to US patents granted to other countries. We shall address questions
such as: How does Israel fare vis a vis other countries in terms of patenting activity?
What is the technological composition of its innovations? Who actually owns the
intellectual property rights, and to what extent can the local economy expect to benefit
from the innovations done by israeli inventors? How do israeli innovations compare to
those of other countries in terms of their "importance" as reflected in patent citations? In
addressing these questions we hope not only to shed light on the case of Israel, but also to
demonstrate the power of this type of data for studying innovation in great detail and, in
particular, for examining in a comparative fashion the innovative performance of
countries and regions.
The reason for focusing on israeli-held patents granted in the US is clear: if
innovations are pursued primarily for export, it is the property rights in the target
countries that have to be protected. True, Israel exports a great deal also to Europe, but it
is usually the case that patents are sought first and foremost in the US (where the
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standards for patentability are more stringent that in most european countries).' Thus,
one can hopefully learn a great deal about export-oriented technologies by analyzing the
israeli patents granted in the US. From the early 1960s through 1998 Israel-based
inventors received about 7,000 patents in the US. This is a large (absolute) number,
and it placed Israel as the 14th largest foreign recipient of US patents, ahead of some
OECD countries such as Norway and Spain.
Adam Jaffe and I have developed in recent years a methodological approach that
allows one to study innovation in great detail with the aid of patent data, and not just to
rely on patent counts.2 In particular, building both on detailed information contained in
patents and on patent citations, we can compute for each individual patent quantitative
indicators of notions such as the "importance", "generality", and "originality" of patents
(see Trajtenberg, Jaffe and Henderson, 1997). We can also trace the "spillovers"
stemming from each patent, and analyze their geographical and temporal patterns (e.g.
are spillovers geographically localized? see Jaffe, Henderson and Trajtenberg, 1993).
Moreover, we have constructed a large data bank containing information on all US
patents granted from 1965 to 1996, that allows us to compute this sort of measures for
any subset of patents. This is a powerful capability that greatly enhances our ability to do
empirical research in the area of the Economics of Technical Change.
The paper is organized as follows: beginning with a concise discussion of the data
in section II, we then examine in sections III and IV the main trends in israeli patenting,
both in itself and in comparison to three groups of countries: the G7, a group of countries
with GDP per capita similar to Israel (Finland, Spain, Ireland and New Zealand), and the
"Asian Tigers" (Taiwan, South Korean, Hong Kong and Singapore). Section V deals with
the technological composition of israeli innovations, relative to that of the US. In section
VT we look in detail at the distribution of israeli assignees, in an attempt to elucidate the
1 In any case, casual evidence indicates that there is a strong correlation between patenting in the US
and patenting in Europe.
2 Rebecca Henderson of MIT also participated in the initial stages of this endeavor, and Bronwyn Hall of
Berkeley and Oxford has been involved in it for the past few years.
With the assistance of Michael Fogarty and his team at Case Western University.
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all important issue of who really controls the rights to the intellectual property embedded
in these patents, and hence who can expect to benefit from it. Finally, section VII
undertakes to examine the relative "importance" or "quality" of israeli patents vis a vis
other countries, in terms of citations received.
H. Data
A patent is a temporary monopoly awarded to inventors for the commercial use of a
newly invented device. For a patent to be granted, the innovation must be non-trivial,
meaning that it would not appear obvious to a skilled practitioner of the relevant
technology, and it must be useful, meaning that it has potential commercial value. If a
patent is granted, an extensive public document is created. The front page of a patent
contains detailed information about the invention, the inventor, the assignee, and the
technological antecedents of the invention, all of which can be accessed in computerized
form (see Figure 1).
These extremely detailed and rich data have, however, two important limitations:
first, the range of patentable innovations constitutes just a sub-set of all research
outcomes, and second, patenting is a strategic decision and hence not all patentable
innovations are actually patented. As to the first limitation, consider an hypothetical
distribution of research outcomes, ranging from the most applied on the left to the most
basic on the right. Clearly, neither end of the continuum is patentable: Maxwell's
equations could not be patented since they do not constitute a device (ideas cannot be
patented). On the other hand, a marginally better mousetrap is not patentable either,
because the innovation has to be non-trivial. Thus, our measures would not capture purely
scientific advances devoid of immediate applicability, as well as run-of-the-mill
technological improvements that are too trite to pass for discrete, codifiable innovations.
The second limitation is rooted in the fact that it may be optimal for inventors not to
apply for patents even though their innovations would satisfy the criteria for patentability.
For example, until 1980 universities in the USA could not collect royalties for the use of
patents derived from federally funded research. This limitation greatly reduced the
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incentive to patent results from such research, which constitutes about 90% of all
university research in the USA. Firms, on the other hand, may elect not to patent and rely
instead on secrecy to protect their property rights.3 Thus, patentability requirements and
incentives to refrain from patenting limit the scope of analysis based on patent data. It is
widely believed that these limitations are not too severe, but that remains an open
empirical issue.
Our working hypothesis here is that, whereas these limitations may affect level
comparisons across fields/industries and perhaps also across countries at a point in time,
they do not affect the analysis of trends and changes over time. In other words, if we
observe for example a big surge in the share of israeli patents in the field of Computers
and Communications and a concomitant decline in the share of Chemicals, it is hard to
believe that these changes are due to underlying changes in the relative propensity to
patent in these two sectors. Rather, the assumption is that these trends reflect true changes
in the amount of innovation done in those fields.
The data that we use here were assembled from various sources. First, from our own
massive data bank, which consists as said of all US patents and their citations, granted
form 1965 through 1996, we extracted the following subsets: (1) all patents granted
during that period to Israel, to the 4 countries in the Reference Group (Finland, Ireland,
New Zealand and Spain), and a random sample of 1/72 of US patents; (2) for all those
patents (over 30,000) we added all the patent citations that they received over the same
period (about 110,000); (3) patent counts by application year for all the other comparison
countries (the G7 and the Asian Tigers). Second, we extracted from the US Patent Office
site in the Internet, all israeli patents granted in 1997 and 1998 (up to December 15,
1998). Third, we extracted from a related site data on "raw applications" for all these
countries. We then added data on population for the comparison countries and Israel, data
on R&D for the G7, and a variety of other data from the NSF and other sources.
There is a large variance across industries in the reliance on patents versus secrecy: see Levin et al, 1987.
The site is not geared towards massive data extractions, and hence we had to develop special software
tools to extract the data. This turned out to be a rather complex and difficult endeavor.
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ifi. Basic facts about israeli patenting in the US
Figure 2 shows the number of successful israeli patent applications in the US over
time, starting in 1968. The growth in the annual number of patents has been very
impressive, starting from about 50 in the late sixties, to over 600 in the late 1990's (i.e.
they grew by a factor of 12). However, as Table 1 reveals, the process was not smooth,
but rather it was characterized by big swings in growth rates. Particularly striking are the
two big jumps that occurred in the second half of the period: from 1983 to 1987 the
number of patents doubled (in just 4 yearsl), and then they doubled again from 1991 to
1995. Notice that in between these two periods (i.e. 1987-91) the annual flow of patents
barely grew. We have to be careful with the timing though: patent applications reflect
(successful) R&D conducted prior to the filing date, with lags varying greatly by sector.
Thus, the number of patents in a particular year should be attributed to investments in
R&D carried out in the previous 1-2 years at least, and in some sectors further back.6
What accounts for the observed path of israeli patenting over time? I shall not
attempt here to conduct a systematic analysis of the factors underlying such trajectory,
but rather I'll content myself with, (1) enumerating key economic developments that
coincided in their timing with turning points in patenting, suggesting that they may
account at least in part for the observed pattern; and (ii) comparing the time series of
patents to R&D expenditures. The first big jump in patenting (1983-87) represents the
very emergence of the high tech sector in Israel, prompted inter alia by explicit policies
designed to support industrial R&D, primarily through the establishment of the Office of
the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Industry and Trade. The in-between "flat" period of
1987-91 (which represents R&D activity done circa 1985-89) presumably reflects the big
macro adjustment and micro restructuring that followed the stabilization program of
1985. That was also the period that saw the end of the "Lavi" program of the Israel
Aircraft Industry (to develop a first-class jet fighter), and the beginning of the downsizing
There were about 300 earlier patents, but we chose to conduct the analysis for the post Six-Day-War
period, since concerted efforts to develop a innovative sector in Israel started only then.
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Table 1
Israeli Patents in the US — Basic Figures
Year "Raw"
Applications
Patents
Issued, bypp Rate ofSuccess Patents GrowthIssued, by Rate %Grant Year IndustrialR&D(1990 $)
1960-67 305 177
1968 73 48 0.66 38 29.71i 87 49 056 61 2.1
1970 90 58 0.64 46 18.4
1971 120 64 0.53 54 10.3
1972 143 72 0.50 55 12.5 68.3
1973 155 82 0.53 84 13.9 74.5
1974 165 106 0.64 89 29.3 76.0**
1975 158 97 0.61 96 -8.5 77.5
1976 175 102 0.58 106 5.2 91.3
1977 206 122 0.59 92 19.6 150.7
1978 202 112 0.55 99 -8.2 153.8
1979 235 131 0.56 81 17.0 181.2
1980 253 140 0.55 113 6.9 205.8
1981 317 143 0.45 122 2.1 186.3
1982 316 159 050 114 11.2 242.9
1983 307 151 0.49 110 -5.0 275.5
1984 376 193 0.51 159 27.8 385.0**
1985 377 184 0.49 182 -4.7 495.4
1986 427 231 0.54 187 25.5 550.3
1987 503 295 0.59 244 27.7 423.2
1988 490 281 0.57 238 -4.7 396.6
1989 624 318 0.51 324 13.2 418.9
1990 608 325 0.53 298 2.2 468.6
1991 633 312 0.49 304 -4.0 510.7
1992 780 355 0.46 335 13.8 559.3
1993 803 421 0.52 314 18.6 574.7
1994 1,040 576 0.55 349 36.8 631.3
1995 1,072 613* 0.57 384 6.4 614.4
1996 1,042 609* fO.58 484 -0.7 668.6
1997 1,185 664* 056 529 9.0
1998 741
Total' 12,962 7,013 0.54 6,432 10.8
* Estimates, based both on the average application-grant lag, and on the "success ratio".
** Estimates, interpolation.
For 1968-98 (i.e. does not include 1960-67).
of defense-related industries. Both of these developments freed large numbers of
qualified scientists, engineers and technicians, that were to play a key role in the
subsequent second big jump of 199 1-95 (again, reflecting R&D activity circa 1989-93).
Notice that the single largest jump occurred in 1994, when the number of patents grew by
a whooping 37%. It is likely that this dramatic increase incorporates, among other factors,
the impact of the mass immigration from the former Soviet Union.
Figure 3 shows industrial R&D expenditures (in constant 1990 $) along with
patents (see also Table i). There is clearly a (lagged) co-movement of the two series, as
manifested for example in the following simple Pearson correlations:
R&D R&D(-1) R&D(-2) R&D(-3)
Patents 0.850 0.877 0.884 0.883
Log(patents)
with Log(R&D)
0.890 0.901 0.922 0.928
Thus, patents lead R&D by 2-3 years, and the correlation is stronger in rates (i.e. when
using logs) than in levels. Looking in more detail, there is the striking run up in R&D
from 1981 to 1986 (in particular, R&D expenditures more than doubled between 1980/8 1
and 1984/85), followed by the doubling of patents between 1983 and 1987. As said, this
is the period that saw the emergence of the High Tech sector, and that is well reflected in
both series. In 1986-88 we see a decline in the level of R&D spending, and the
concomitant flattening of patenting in 1987-91, and then again a sustained increase
through the early-mid nineties that anticipates the second big jump in patenting. It is clear
then (and reassuring) that industrial R&D expenditures are closely linked (with a
reasonable lag) to patents, but ftirther research is needed to understand the joint
dynamics, integrating at the same time the sort of qualitative factors mentioned before.
6Notice for example the figures for the mid seventies: the number of patents grew substantially in 1973 and
in 1974, but then declined in 1975 and barely grew in 1976. Moving back these figures 1-2 years would
provide the right picture in terms of the impact of the Yom Kippur War.
The R&D figures are from Griliches arid Regev (1999), table 1. Since these refer to industrial R&D, it
may be more appropriate to relate them to israeli corporate patents (see section VI below) than to total
patents. In practice the two patent series move pretty much in tandem, and hence the correlations with R&D
of either series are virtually the same.
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The above cursory description carries a warning sign (or at least a serious
question mark) for the future. Given the high rates of obsolescence of "Knowledge
Capital" (K) that characterize High Tech sectors, a steady stream of innovations (here in
the form of the annual flow of patents, F1) is needed just to maintain current levels of K1.
Faster obsolescence (as may be happening in some areas of computers and
communications) thus requires a growing P, and the same applies if we want to see a
steadily growing stock of Kt. As we have seen, the big jumps in Pt are likely to have
occurred, to a significant extent, as a consequence of big "shocks" to the system (e.g. in
policy, availability of relevant inputs, etc.), including of course the jumps in R&D
expenditures. The question is then how we expect to bring about/support a sustained
increase in P, in the future, absent further (positive) shocks of that sort. Perhaps the
attainment of "critical masses" in several dimensions of the High Tech sector will
generate by itself the required future growth, but that remains to be seen.
Table 1 shows also the number of "raw applications", that is, the overall number
of patent applied for in the USA by israeli inventors. Of these, only those under "patents
issued, by application year" (which is the figure we shall use all along) were actually
granted, the rest did not pass the rather stringent tests of the US Patent Office (novelty,
usefulness, etc.). The average "success rate" over the whole period was of 54%, with no
clear trend over time (except for the fact that it was clearly higher in the first decade,
1968-77). We shall return to this datum in the context of international comparisons, but it
is worth pointing out now that a 54% success rate suggests that there are margins for
improvements even within this (narrow) context. That is, close to half of the innovations
that were good enough to merit a costly application to the US Patent Office,8 do not seem
to bear fruit, in the sense that are not worthy of a US patent. Perhaps there is room for
low-cost policies/actions that would target the R&D efforts underlying the unsuccessful
46% and channel them into more fruitful directions.
That constitutes already a high standard.
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IV. International Comparisons
Whereas the detailed analysis of Israeli patenting is revealing in itself (as we shall
see in subsequent sections), we resort to international comparisons in order to put in
perspective the overall level and trend over time in Israeli patenting. We have chosen for
that purpose 3 different groups of countries, as follows:
L The G7: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, UK and USA.
2. A "Reference Group": Finland, Ireland, New Zealand and Spain.
3. The "Asian Tigers": Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan.
The Reference Group was chosen according to their GDP per capita in the early 1990's,
that is, we chose the 4 countries that had at that time a level of GDP per capita closest to
that of Israel (in ppp terms). Notice that, except for Spain, the other 3 countries in this
group are very similar to Israel also in terms of population.
Appendix 1 contains detailed patent figures for each country, and Figures 4-6
show the time patterns of patents per capita for Israel versus each of the above groups of
countries. We chose to normalize the number of patents by population, simply because
this is a widely available and accurate statistic that provides a consistent scale factor.
Another normalization of interest would be R&D expenditures, but except for the G7, the
figures for the other countries are far from satisfactory. Figure 4 reveals that Israel
started virtually at the bottom of the G7 (together with Italy), but by 1987 it had climbed
ahead of Italy, UK, and France and was in par with Canada. In the early-mid nineties it
moved ahead of Canada and (the unified) Germany,9 thus becoming 3d after the USA and
Japan. Using civilian R&D as deflator for these countries show a similar result. Thus,
there is no question that Israel had surged forward and placed itself in the forefront of
technological advanced countries, at least in terms of (normalized) numbers of patents. It
is interesting to note also that, other than Israel, the only country that grew all along since
1970 was Japan. The others were either stagnant or declined (as the USA did) until the
early 1 980s. The fact that 1983 proved to be a turning point for all of the largest countries
Had Germany remained divided, Israel would probably reach parity with west Germany by 1998-99.
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at the same time (USA Japan, Germany, and to a lesser extent also for Canada) is
interesting in itself, but remains to be explained.
The comparison with the Reference Group shows a very clear picture: the only
country that is "game" is Finland, which has followed a pattern virtually identical to
Israel, both in levels and in the timing of fluctuations (this striking resemblance deserves
further scrutiny — see below). The other 3 countries are well behind, and have remained at
the bottom without any significant changes over time. The one surprise there is Ireland,
which has pursued for over a decade active policies to attract foreign investments in
advanced technologies. As to the Asian Tigers, we can see immediately that Taiwan has
grown extremely rapidly since the early eighties, actually surpassing Israel as of 1997.'°
And indeed, Taiwan is widely regarded today as a High Tech powerhouse, after being
associated with low-tech, imitative behavior for a long time. South Korea seems to be
embarked on a similar path. By contrast, Hong Kong and Singapore remain well behind.
For all their limitations, these comparisons correspond quite well to what we
know about these countries, only that this way we get a much more detailed and precise
picture of the underlying trends. The observed patterns for Finland, Ireland and Taiwan
are particularly revealing, and exemplify the power of patent statistics to uncover
phenomena that otherwise are hard to detect.
Table 2 summarizes the main statistics for all these countries, including their
"success rates" and growth rates in patenting, over the whole period (1968-97) and for the
past 5 years. Notice that, in terms of recent patents per capita, Israel stands third after the
USA and Japan, in comparison to allthe 15 countries, and in terms of growth rates it also
ranks third, after South Korea, Taiwan and New Zealand (the latter not yet an important
player). This is no doubt a remarkable achievement. The picture is less flattering in terms
of success rates: Israel ranks 8th, after most G7 countries, Finland and South Korea. The
average for those countries ahead of Israel is 61%; if Israel were able to reach this mark
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Table 2
Country Statistics: Averages by 5- and 30 Year Periods
Country
Patents per Year Patents per
Ca ita
Success Rate Annual Growth
Rate
1968-97 1992-97 1968-97 1992-97 1968-97 1992-9 7 1968-97 1992-9 7
Israel 234 577 5.3 10.2 54% 56% 10.1% 13.3%
G7
Canada 1,525 2,401 6.1 8.] 56% 55% 3.4% 5.5%
France 2,423 2,896 4.5 5.0 66% 63% 1.9% 0.5%
Germany 6,338 7,250 9.8 8.9 65% 63% 2.3% 2.4%
Italy 937 1,197 1.7 2.1 59% 58% 2.8% -0.4%
Japan 13,226 23,847 11.5 19.0 65% 61% 8.4% 2.8%
UK 2,547 2,494 4.4 4.3 55% 51% -0.2% 3.1%
USA 46,913 66,325 19.8 25.2 62% 59% 1.6% 5.3%
Reference Group
Finland 214 438 4.5 8.6 57% 58% 8.6% 10.0%
Ireland 35 60 1.0 1.7 49% 48% 6.8% 5.5%
New
Zealand
42 6] 1.3 1.7 42% 42% 4.9% 16.9%
Spain 105 173 0.3 0.4 49% 50% 4.2% 3.1%
4sian Tigers
Hong Kong 39 95 0.7 1.5 49% 46% 12.5% 9.6%
Singapore 22 83 0.8 2.6 55% 52% 16.5% 10.3%
South Korea 443 1,989 1.1 4.4 61% 62% 27.7% 27.9%
15.7%Taiwan 554 2,006 2.8 9.3 44% 47% 33.8%
from the present 56%, that would represent an increase of about 10% in the annual
number of patents granted. This would be like an increase in the productivity of the R&D
process, rather than an increase in the overall level of resources devoted to inventive
activity. As to growth rates, Israel grew faster than both the G7 and the reference group
over the whole period, with wide fluctuations in growth rates over time. The Asian Tigers
display much higher rates, but we have to remember that they started from very low
levels, and hence these rates should be seen primarily as "catch up".
Lastly, it is important to note that in the present context the absolute number of
patents remains key (similarly to the absolute level of R&D expenditures, rather than its
ratio to GDP). In order to establish a viable, self-sustaining High Tech sector, a country
has to achieve a critical mass in terms of pertinent infrastructure, skills development,
managerial experience, testing facilities, marketing and communication channels,
financial institutions, etc. Similarly, it is clear by now that spillovers, and in particular
regional spillovers, are extremely important in fueling the growth of this sector. Once
again, the amount of spillovers generated, and the ability to capture external spillovers is
a function of absolute, not relative size. If we take the number of patents as indicative of
the absolute size of the innovative sector, then Israel has still a long way to go: it stands
well below all the G7 countries, and is about 1/4 the size of Taiwan and South Korea. In
order to get to the (absolute) level as of today of say the lower tier G7 countries (Canada,
France, UK) and the leading Asian Tigers (Taiwan and South Korea), israeli patenting
would have to grow at a rate of about 30% per year over the next 5 years! At present
growth rates (of 13.3% per year), it would take 10 years to get there. That's too long, by
all accounts.
V. The Technological Composition of Israeli Patented Innovations
The US Patent Office has developed over the years a very elaborate classification
system by which it assigns patents to technological categories. It consists of some 400
main patent classes, and over 150,000 patent subclasses. The 400 or so classes have been
'° The number of patents granted to Taiwan inventors reached 4,045 in 1998, almost doubling that of 1997
(this figure is not incorporated in our statistics) and hence it is clear that the trend is accelerating. See
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aggregated traditionally into 4 fields: chemical, mechanical, electrical and other. We have
developed recently a new classification scheme, by which we assigned these 400 patent
classes into 35 technological "sub-categories", and these in turn are aggregated into 6
categories: Computers and Communications, Electrical and Electronics, Drugs and
Medicine, Chemical, Mechanical and Other.
Figures 8a and 8b show the breakdown of israeli patents by these six
technological categories (in percentages) over time. Figure 7 does the same but for US
patents," thus providing us with a standard of comparison. Let us start from the latter,
which is supposed to reflect the main world-wide trends in technology itself The pattern
is quite clear: From 1968 and up to about 1980 all series were pretty much flat, i.e. the
relative shares of each of the six categories remained virtually constant. The shares of
Mechanical and Other were highest (over a quarter each), then came Chemical (2 1-23%),
and further down Electrical and Electronic (15%). Both Drugs and Medicine and
Computers and Communications accounted to a tiny fraction back then, up to 5% each.
Starting in the early 1980s this static picture starts to change, as follows: the 3 top fields
decline (Mechanical decline the most), Electrical and Electronics does not change at all,
and the two bottom ones surge forward, with Computers and Communications accounting
in 1994 for over 15% of all patents.
As Figure 9 reveals, the pattern for Israel is similar, except that the changes are
much more abrupt (and the initial levels are also quite different). The most striking
development is the surge of Computers and Communications from about 5% in the
1970's (as in the US), to a full 25% by 1994 and beyond. Likewise, Drugs and Medicine
doubles its share from 10% to 20%. Electrical and Electronics oscillates around 15%
(exactly as in the US), increasing recently to 20%. The flip side is the much more
pronounced decline in the traditional categories, with Chemicals exhibiting by far the
sharpest drop, from 40% at the beginning of the period, to less than 10% by 1996. Thus,
the "big story" in israeli patenting is the growth in Computers and Communications and
however Table 3 for the peculiar composition of assignees for Taiwan.
This distribution is based on the sample of 1/72 of US patents (over 20,000 in total).
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Figure 7
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Drugs and Medicine at a significantly faster pace than in the US, and the even faster
decline in Chemicals. The composition of innovations has thus changed dramatically in
Israel, and seemingly in a healthy way, in the sense that we are in tandem with
world-wide changes in technology, but we experience them at an accelerated rate.
Finally, Appendix 2 shows the actual number of patents in each sub-category, sorted by
the cumulative number in the past 5 years.
VI. Who Owns What? A View at the Distribution of Israeli Patents Assignees
By way of introduction, we need to describe the different "players" related to any
given patent. First there are the inventors, that is, those individuals directly responsible
for carrying out the innovation embedded in the patent. Second there is the assignee, that
is, the legal entity (corporation, government agency, university, etc.) that owns the patent
rights, assigned to it by the inventor(s). However, there are individual inventors that work
on their own and have not yet assigned the rights of the patent to a legal entity at the time
of issue, in which case the patent is classified as "unassigned" (or "assigned to
individuals").'2 For most patents the inventors are typically employees of a firm, in which
case the assignee is the firm itself
According to the conventions of the US Patent Office, the "nationality" of a
patent is determined by the address (at the time of application) of the first inventor. That
is, if a patent has many inventors and they are located in a variety of countries, the
location of the first inventor listed on the patent determines to which country it is deemed
to belong. Likewise, if the assignee is located in a country different from that of the first
inventor, it is once again the location of the latter that determines the nationality of the
patent. Thus, in the patent shown on Figure 1, the first inventor has an israeli address,
whereas the other three inventors listed have addresses in the USA, and the patent was
assigned to Intel Co. of Santa Clara, CA; nevertheless, the patent is formally classified as
israeli. 13
12 That is, the inventor herself may appear as the legal entity that owns the patent rights.
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The data that we have presented so far (e.g. number of patents by countries) were
compiled according to this convention: Israeli patents are those for which the address of
the first inventor was in Israel, regardless of the identity and location of the assignees or
of the other inventors, and similarly for the other countries. The important question now
is, who actually owns the rights to these inventions? Keeping in mind that for patents
labeled "israeli" it was indeed israeli scientists and engineers that were responsible for the
"innovative act" that led to these patents (they certainly provided the "brain power"),'4"5
the question is: which entity, commercial or otherwise, is in a position to reap the
economic benefits from these inventions?
At the upper level of aggregation there are 3 possibilities: (1) That there is no
assignee (i.e. the inventor herself retains the rights to the patent), and hence it is not clear
if and when the patent will be commercially exploited; (ii) that the assignee is also israeli,
that is, that the location of the entity owning the rights to the patent is in Israel; (iii) that
the assignee is foreign. Even the seemingly sharp distinction between (ii) and (iii) is not
quite as clear. There are on the one hand israeli corporations that have established
subsidiaries or otherwise related firms in other countries, and they may choose to assign
the patents (done is Israel) to their "foreign" subsidiaries (but in fact we should regard
them as israeli). On the other hand, there are multinational corporations that have
established subsidiaries in Israel, and some may choose to assign the locally produced
patents to the israeli subsidiary, even though the multinational retains effective control
over the property rights. We have dealt as well as we could with the first difficulty, by
examining the names of the assignees, and spotting those cases that were designated as
foreign assignees but were clearly israeli firms (e.g. Elscint US, Ormat, etc.). By contrast
13 Clearly, this convention is completely inconsequential for anything but the compilation of statistics about
international patenting activity.
4 We ignore for the moment the issue of the possible variety of nationalities of inventors, that is, we
assume that for israeli patents all inventors reside in Israel and not just the first, and the same for other
countries.
15 The reason we have to be careful with the wording here is as follows: suppose that an israeli scientist
goes to a sabbatical to MIT in Cambridge, MA, and carries out a project in a lab there that results in a
patented invention (there are quite a few of these in the data). Such a patent would be labeled as israeli, but
the assignee would be MIT. Now, the invention was made possible not only by the ideas and efforts of the
israeli scientist, but also by the facilities, physical and otherwise, of the host institution. The end result is no
doubt a function of both.
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we have not addressed the second difficulty, but rather taken on face value the address of
the assignee, e.g. Motorola Hertzlia will appear as an israeli assignee, Motorola US as a
foreign assignee.
The distinction between these 3 categories, unassigned, israeli ("local") and
foreign, is then telling of the extent to which the country can expect to benefit from "its"
patents. The unassigned patents may of course find their way to successful commercial
applications (and many do), but they typically face much higher uncertainty than
corporate assignees that own from the start the patents issued to their employees.
Moreover, corporations are in a better position to capture internally the spillovers
generated by those innovations. Thus, the higher is the percentage of unassigned patents,
the less would be the economic potential of a given stock of patents. The distinction
between foreign and local assignees is presumably informative of the probability that the
local economy would be the prime beneficiary of the new knowledge embedded in the
patent. One can draw various scenarios whereby foreign ownership may be as good if not
better in that respect than local ownership of the patent rights (e.g. the foreign
multinational offers marketing channels for the innovation that would be inaccessible to
local firms). Still, we are rapidly moving in many technological areas to an era where the
prime asset is the effective control of intellectual property, and presumably that is
correlated with the ownership of patent rights. However, we do not need to take a strong
stand in this respect, only to agree that this distinction is informative and quite likely
important for understanding the potential value for a country of its stock of patents.
A further distinction for assigned patents, whether israeli or foreign, is according
to the "type" of assignee, and in this context we consider 3 main categories (although we
have made actually finer distinction in the data): corporate, government and universities
(including hospitals and related research institutions). The working hypothesis is that the
likelihood of down-the-line commercial application of a patent would be higher if owned
by a corporation, and lower if owned by the Government or by Universities.
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Figure 10 shows the distribution of israeli patents among different types of
assignees for the whole period, at the two levels of aggregation. Just slightly over half of
the total number of patents received during the past 30 years is owned by designated
israeli assignees. Almost a third are unassigned, and the remaining 17% belong to
foreign assignees. Of the 53% owned by israeli assignees, a full third went to Israeli
Universities and to the Israeli Government, the latter mostly to Defense-related
institutions (primarily to "Rafael" and to "Taas", the Military Industry). Thus, the
percentage of all israeli patents that belong to israeli corporate assignees is just over a
third: 0.53x0.670.355. This percentage is very low by any standard (see below): it
implies that only a third of all patents generated by israeli inventors have a relatively high
chance to bring in economic benefits to the israeli economy. To repeat, this is only a
probabilistic statement: for sure many of the patents granted to Universities, to Rafael, or
to private individuals eventually resulted (or will result in the future) in commercially
successful innovations for israeli firms. Still, unassigned patents, patents granted to
foreign assignees, or to Universities and the Government presumably offer lower
expected local returns than those assigned to israeli corporations.
The following table puts these figures into perspective (see below for a more detailed
comparison):
Distribution of Assignee Typesa
_______________
USA
(1963-93)
All other
Countries
(1963-93)
Israel
(1968-97)
Corporations 71% 84%b 43%
Unassigned 24% 15% 37%
Government 3% 1% 6%
Universities 2% na 16%
Source: National Science Foundation, Science and Engineering Indicators, 1996, appendix table 6-7, p.
275, in addition to our data.
apercenbges out of total number of patents issued to assignees or individuals of a given country, thus not
including those assigned to foreign assignees.
universities, but these account for a tiny percentage.
The differences between Israel and both the USA and all other countries are
startling: Israel has much higher percentages of the 3 bottom types, Unassigned,
Government and Universities, particularly so for Universities. As a consequence, the
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Figure 10
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percentage of corporate patents, those that have the highest ex ante chance of finding
commercial applications, is just 43%, almost half the corresponding percentage for all
other countries except the USA, and forty percent lower compared to the USA. These
figures mimic the distribution of R&D by sector: in 1995 just 45% of civilian national
R&D in Israel was conducted by the business sector, as opposed to 72% in the US, and a
median of 62% for OECD countries (CBS, 1998, table 17).
Table 3 offers a more detailed (if slightly different) perspective. In it we show
comparative figures for the upper "pie" of Figure 10, that is, the distribution between
unassigned, "local" and foreign assignees.'6 As we can see, the percentage of local
assignees is much lower than that of all G7 countries except for Canada. As to the
reference group, Finland has a much higher share of local assignees than Israel, the other
3 (with few patents each) have lower percentages. In the case of the Asian Tigers, the two
large patent holders stand at opposite extremes: Taiwan has a very low percentage of
local assignees (due to an extremely high share of unassigned, 64%!), whereas South
Korea has an extremely high share (topped only by Japan). These differences are clearly
related to the industrial organization of these countries (e.g. Taiwan has a very large
number of small enterprises, and an extremely high rate of turnover of firms, whereas
South Korea is dominated by huge, stable chaebol), but it is a topic worth of further
investigation. The contrast between the latest figures (for 1998) and those for the whole
period 1976-98 reveal that the G7 countries are quite stable, whereas most of the others
increased the share of local assignees, some of them very significantly such as Taiwan,
Singapore, New Zealand and Spain. Thus, the world-wide trend is towards an increase in
the share of local assignees. What characterizes Israel vis a vis other countries is that both
the shares of unassigned and of foreign are relatively high (the only other countries for
which that is true are all minor players: New Zealand, Spain and Hong Kong).
These figures are not strictly comparable to those presented so far, for the following reasons: (1) The
number of patents assigned to a country in table 3 include all patents in which any of the inventors resides
in that country; (2) the period covered in table 3 is 1976-98 for granted patents, as opposed to 1968-97 for
applied patents in all other tables. Both are due to limitations of the search capabilities in the Internet site of
the US Patent Office.
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Table 3
Distribution of Assignee Types — International Comparison
1976-98
Number of Patents Percentages
Country Unassign
ed
Foreign Local Total Unassign
ed
Foreign Local
Israel 1,815 1,807 3,443 7,065 26% 26% 49% (52%)
G7
Canada 15,756 8,614 21,175 45,545 35% 19% 46% (50%)
France 6,567 8,883 49,500 64,950 10% 14% 76% (75%)
Germany 13,147 17,060 117,660 147,867 9% 12% 80% (77%)
Italy 3,957 3,904 19,293 27,154 15% 14% 71% (72%)
Japan 9,003 6,950 341,854 357,807 3% 2% 96% (95%)
TJK 5,812 15,698 37,693 59,203 10% 27% 64% na
USA 296,191 19,546 887,308 1,203,045 25% 2% 74% (76%)
Refrrence Group
Finland 834 422 4,739 5,995 14% 7% 79% (81%)
Ireland 259 512 385 1,156 22% 44% 33% (32%)
New
Zealand
614 224 685 1,523 40% 15% 45% (52%)
Spain 1,048 784 1,503 3,335 31% 24% 45% (51%)
Asian Tigers
Hong Kong 688 760 1,824 3,272 21% 23% 56% (55%)
Singapore 110 488 274 872 13% 56% 31% (43%)
SouthKorea 1,154 531 10,666 12,351 9% 4% 86% (92%)
Taiwan 13,296 991 6,362 20,649 64% 5% 31% (44%)
* Numbers in parenthesis: the percentages for 1998.
Foreign assignees —afurther look
We have referred extensively to the fact that Israel has a very high percentage of
foreign ownership of patents received by israeli inventors, compared to other countries.
Who are these foreign assignees? The largest foreign patent holders of israeli patents are:
Motorola (112 patents), Intel (95), IBM (75) and National Semiconductors (57). Of
course, these are the familiar names that have had a strong presence in Israel for quite a
while now. The following table shows the annual number of israeli patents taken by these
corporations:
Israeli Patents Assigned to large Foreign Corporations
Time Period Average Annual
-
Number of Patents
1968-1986 2
1987-1989 6
1990-1991 18
1992-1993 36
1994-1995 70
Thus, the number of israeli patents taken by these corporations grew extremely
fast, from less than 10 prior to 1990 to about 70 in the mid 1990's, whereas in the course
of the same period the overall number of israeli patents barely doubled.
As already suggested, we have to be very careful in how to judge this
phenomenon. On the one hand the fact that these multinationals have established a
foothold in Israel is extremely important in terms of the (positive) externalities that they
generate, as well as in opening foreign markets for israeli technology. On the other hand
they may be competing for the one key resource that Israel has, namely, innovative talent
in cutting edge technologies (see below). It is this talent that they seek in opening R&D
labs in Israel, and in so doing they acquire control over the intellectual property generated
there. Whatever the normative stand that one takes on this issue, it is imperative to know
well the facts, and this is what we have attempted here.'7
17 The wider issue (not addressed here) is how to formulate R&D policies in the era of globalization,
whereby brainpower and spillovers flow freely across national boundaries. The figures presented here offer
partial evidence on these flows.
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Trends in the distribution of assignees
So far we have looked at the distribution of assignees for the whole stock of
israeli patents of the past 30 years, and the picture is rather bleak; however, the picture
brightens significantly when we examine time trends. Figure 11 shows the distribution
over time of the unassigned-local-foreign percentages: there is a slow increase in the
share of israeli assignees, approaching now 60% (from about 45% in the 1970's), a
marked decline in the share of unassigned (from about 40% in the 1970s to 20% in the
mid 1990's), but also a significant increase in the share of foreign patents from about
10% in the 1980s to over 20% in the 1990s. The sharp and persistent decline in the share
of unassigned patents (we are now in that respect at the level of the USA) is certainly
very good news; the remaining (and still open) question is how to relate to the increase in
the share of foreign assignees.
Figure 12 displays the distribution of Israeli assignees among the various types:
corporate, universities, and government. Here the main trends are very encouraging: the
share of corporate-own patents has risen steadily from a low of 30% at the beginning of
the period, to a high of 83% in 1997. This rise came mostly from the corresponding
dramatic drop in the share of universities: from a high of about half of all patents at first,
to 12% if 1997. The share of government patents has fluctuated quite a bit around the
10% mark, but seems to be decreasing steadily as of the early 1990s (to 6% in 1997).
Still, a total of 18% for Government and Universities combined is very high compared to
all other countries, and we expect that this percentage will continue to shrink to
internationally-acceptable levels of less than 10%.
Figure 13 summarizes these trends into one figure, the share of israeli corporate
patents out of the total number of israeli patents. As already suggested, these are the
patents with the highest expected payoff for the israeli economy, and hence the focus on
them. Once again, the overall trend here is certainly encouraging: israeli corporate patents
accounted for a dismal 15% at the beginning of the period, and now account for almost
half (48%) of all israeli patents. As we can see, the rise was not smooth, and actually
throughout the 1980s it hovered around the 35% mark. It is only since 1992 that it has
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climbed steadily up to today's level. Of course, there is still a very long way to go: in
order to take full advantage of the potential embedded in israeli inventions to the benefit
of the israeli economy, this percentage would have to increase steadily (to, say, the
70-80% mark). That would require a continuous reshuffling of inventive resources, away
from all other competing players and towards the israeli corporate sector.'8
Competing for talent?
As already suggested, the identity of the assignees may be informative not only of
who owns what, but of who competes for the limited pool of skills, scientific and
technological talent and entrepreneurial drive that Israel has. One way to approach this
issue is through the information displayed in Figure 14, that is, the distribution of patents
by technological categories, for each type of assignee. Thus, foreign and israeli
corporations look quite similar in that respect, except that foreign assignees are much
more active than israelis in Computers and Communications (the share of foreigners in
that field is 33%, versus 15% for israeli assignees). By contrast, both Universities and
individual inventors operate in rather different technological areas than corporations:
Universities primarily in Chemistry and Drugs and Medicine, individual inventors in
Mechanical and "Other". In short, foreign and local corporations do seem to compete for
the same sort of human capital, universities and individual inventors do not.
VU. The Relative "Importance" of Israeli Patents
Simple patent counts are a very imperfect measure of innovative activity, simply
because patents vary a great deal in their technological and economic "importance" or
"value", and the distribution of such values is extremely skewed. Recent research has
shown that patent citations can effectively play the role of proxies for the "importance" of
patents, as well as providing a way of tracing spillovers (see Trajtenberg, 1990, Jaffe and
Trajtenberg, 1996, and Henderson, Jaffe and Trajtenberg, 1998). By citations we mean
the references to previous patents that appear in the front page of each patent (see Figure
1).
18 We do not see so far such reshuffling in the distribution of R&D expenditures by sector— see CBS
(1998), table 1.
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Patent citations serve an important legal function, since they delimit the scope of
the property rights awarded by the patent. Thus, if patent 2 cites patent 1, it implies that
patent represents a piece of previously existing knowledge upon which patent 2
builds, and over which 2 cannot have a claim. The applicant has a legal duty to disclose
any knowledge of the prior art, but the decision regarding which patents to cite ultimately
rests with the patent examiner, who is supposed to be an expert in the area and hence to
be able to identify relevant prior art that the applicant misses or conceals.19
We use data on patent citations here in order to examine the "quality" of Israeli
patents vis a vis US patents, and patents of the reference group of countries. That is, we
ask to what extent israeli patents are more or less frequently cited than the patents of
these other countries, controlling for various effects. Moreover, we analyze how these
differences vary over technological categories, and over time. We regress the number of
citations received by each patent (ncites), on control variables (dummies for 5
technological classes as well as for grant years), a dummy for the US and another for the
group of reference countries. The sign and magnitude of the coefficients of these two
latter dummies are telling of the extent to which israeli patents receive more or less
citations on average than these other countries, controlling for technological composition
and age of patents. The results for the benchmark regression are as follows:
Number of obs = 37313
F( 7, 37272) = 196.21
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared 0.1330
Adj R-squared = 0.1321
Root MSE = 5.0211
ncites Coef. Std. Err. t P>ItI
+
usa I .6954136 .0793592 8.763 0.000
refer I —.6985195 .0855526 —8.165 0.000
chemical I .335095 .0773475 4.332 0.000
19Because of the role of the examiner and the legal significance of patent citations, there is reason to
believe that patent citations are less likely to be contaminated by extraneous motives in the decision of what
to cite than other bibliographic data such as citations in the scientific literature (Van Raan, 1988; Wei.ngart
et al, 1988). Moreover, bibliomethc data are of limited value in tracing the economic impact of scientific
results, since they are not linked to economic agents or decisions.
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cmpcmm 2.372321 .1090868 21.747 0.000
drgsmed I 1.61299 .107602 14.990 0.000
elec I .3790388 .0845855 4.481 0.000
mech I —.2321834 .0745865 —3.113 0.002
cons I 2.988059 .0842784 35.455 0.000
gyear I F(33,37272) = 142.390 0.000
(34 categories)
Thus, US patents are "better" than israeli patents by about 25% (the coefficient of
0.695 for the US divided by the constant term of 2.98), but israeli patents are of
significantly better quality than the patents of the reference countries. Next we ask what
happened to these differences over time, that is, are israeli patents getting better or worse
relative to other countries? Just interacting the coefficients of interest in the above
regression with time won't do, because as time advances (i.e. as we get closer to the
present, which necessarily truncates fttture citations) the number of citations received
declines. One way to go about it is to define the dependent variable in logs, which in
principle should be immune to truncation (since the coefficients on the dummies for
countries are in percentage terms).2° In the following regressions we compare in that
fashion the relative standing of israeli patents in the last 10 years versus the previous 20
years (dummies for tech categories are included in both but not shown):
gra.ut year<1986
Number of obs = 20287
F) 7, 20257) = 54.69
Prob > F = 0.0000
R-squared 0.0859
Adj R-squared = 0.0846
inciteOl Coef. Std. Err. t P>tI
+
usa I .1928575 .0384885 5.011 0.000
refer I —.2633523 .0427346 —6.163 0.000
cons .5544518 .0402906 13.761 0.000
gyear I F(22,20257) = 76.064 0.000
(23 categories)
Grant year> 1986
Number of obs = 17026
F) 7, 17008) = 128.21
20 The only remaining difficwty Is what to do about observations with zero citations, which account for
about 1/3 of all patents. A number of standard procedures are at hand, here we chose to assign the value of
0.1 to the observations with 0 citations, but the results are pretty much the same if one resorts to other
means.
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rob > F = 0.0000
R-squared = 0.3667
Adj R-squared = 0.3661
lnciteOl Coef. Std. Err. t
+
usa I .1751703 .029623 5.913 0.000
refer I —.266625 .031084 —8.578 0.000
cons I —.4513321 .032458 —13.905 0.000
gyear I F(10,17008) = 935.922 0.000
(11 categories)
Thus, whereas in the pre-1986 period US patents were about 19% better than
israeli patents, in the post-1986 period that advantage seems to have decreased slightly
(to 17%). The relative standing of israeli patents vis a vis the reference group of countries
did not change. We also run similar regressions for the whole period whereby time is
interacted with the dummies for the US and reference countries, and the results are pretty
much the same, except that their significance is rather fragile.2' In any case, it is quite
clear that the converse is not true, that is, one can easily reject the null hypothesis that the
quality of israeli patents has declined over time, in the wake of the rapid growth in their
numbers.
In Figure 15 we show graphically the results of the analysis for each technological
class. The columns represent the value of the respective dummies, e.g. the coefficient of
the USA dummy in a (separate) regression just for Drugs and Medicine was 1.01,
whereas the coefficient of the reference group dummy in that same regression was —1.06,
and so forth.22 Thus, israeli patents are particularly good in Computers and
Communications (in that category we are on par with the US, and much better than the
reference countries), whereas the biggest disadvantage vis a vis the US resides in Drugs
and Medical.
21 The coefficient of (time x USA) is negativebut borderline significant, and moreover its significance does
depend on how we treat the observations with zero citations.
22 We don't show there the s.e. (or t values): most coefficients are significant, not all, but the qualitative
results are well represented in the figure.
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In Figure 16 we look into Drugs and Medical in more detail, and the picture that
emerges is as follows. We stand at a large disadvantage vis a vis the US both in Surgery
and Medical Instrumentation and in Drugs, but we are actually at a small advantage in
Biotechnology and Molecular Biology. The reason for the disadvantage in Drugs is clear:
the israeli pharmaceutical industry has focused for the most part on generics, which by
definition are not breakthroughs and therefore do not receive many citations, whereas the
pharmaceutical industry in the US is by far the most advanced in the world. The disparity
in Medical Instrumentation is more puzzling and requires ftirther scrutiny, given the
relatively high standards of that sector in Israel. The very good news resides in
Biotechnology, where as said Israeli patents are of comparable importance to those of the
us.23
Thus, israeli patents are on par with the US in terms of the "importance" or
"quality" of its innovations in two technological fields that stand at the forefront of
technology worldwide, Computers and Communications and Biotechnology. The former
is also Israel's fastest growing field, the latter is still very small but growing. This is a
very reassuring finding, and speaks of the great potential that resides with the High Tech
sector in Israel.
23 But we have to remember that there are still relatively few israeli patents in Biotechnology (see Appendix
2): just 196 for the whole period.
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Appendix 2
Distribution of Patents by Tech_SubCategories*
Sub Category 5 years (90-94) Total (68-97)
Communications 198 417
Computer Hardware & Software 197 409
Drugs 140 391
Surgery & Med Inst 135 424
Miscellaneous-chemical 104 389
Miscellaneous-Others 102 362
Power Systems 86 266
Biotechnology 77 196
Mat_ Proc & Handling 76 238
Measuring & Testing 63 230
Miscellaneous-Mechanical 56 187
Furniture, House Fixtures 55 168
Nuclear & X-rays 54 158
Organic Compounds 50 244
Optics 46 116
Electrical Devices 43 125
Miscellaneous-Elec 41 111
Fluid Sprinkling, Spraying, and Diffusing 41 175
Transportation 40 100
Liquid Purification or Separation 40 162
Agriculture, Husbandry, Food 37 150
Resins 32 125
Miscellaneous-Drgs&Med 26 90
Heating 26 109
Semiconductor Devices 23 58
Electrical Lighting 22 69
Refrigeration 20 76
Amusement Devices 20 101
Motors & Engines + Parts 20 110
Computer Peripherals 18 40
Receptacles 17 60
Fluid Handling 17 91
Information Storage 16 55
Apparel & Textile 15 57
Metal Working 10 50
Pipes&Joints 9 38
Agriculture, Food, Textiles 7 47
Earth Working & Wells 6 57
Coating 5 41
Gas 3 11
Total 1993 6304
* Sorted by last 5 years totals
